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Small farmers often have no credit records and a  *  Establishing a common bond other than
mixed reputation for repayment. Processing and  credit, such as mandatory deposits that will only
colection  costs of loans made to small farmers  bc: reimbursed upon ful  repayment, enhances
are high relative to the amount lent, so that it is  loan repayment at the same time as it introduces
hardly surprising that rural lenders often prefer  savings mobilization.
to channel  their funds  to larger  farmers.
* Denying access to future credit to all group
Lending groups and credit cooperatives have  members in the case of default by any member is
been ascribed the potential to reach small  the most effective and least costly way of
farmers with affordable credit because the  enforcing joint liability.  But this only works as
processing of one large loan rather than numer-  long as the lending institution can continue to
ous small loans may allow for savings in admin-  provide clients with favorable and timely credit
istrative costs.  As these lending arrangements  services.
entail some form of joint liability, they have also
been expected to reduce the risks of loan default.  Important factors for successful outcomes of
credit cooperatives include:
In practice, the record of group lending
schemes and credit cooperatives has been mixed,  *  Bottom-up institutional developmcnt and
although unfavorable experiences have mostly  training at the grass roots as well as all manage-
been due to shortcomings in implementation and  ment level.
complemenitary  activities rather than inadequacy
of the approaches themselves.  *  Savings mobilization by credit cooperatives
renders them financially less dependent on
Some of the factors crucial for successful  outside sources and enhances borrowers incen-
group lending are:  tives to repay.
- Homogeneous borrowing groups that are  *  Credit cooperatives shouldn't rush to
jointly liable and assume some managerial and  expand their activities beyond financial interme-
supervisory responsibilities. Mandatory joint  diation before strong institutional and manage-
liability has only a positive effect on repayments  rial capabilities exist.
as long as borrowers have strong reason to
believe that the majority of their peers will also
repay.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This  paper  reviews  experiences  with  group  lending  and  credit
cooperatives in  rural  areas of  developing  countries and  attempts to derive
lessons  for  Bank  policy  dealing  with  such  lending  arrangements.  It
assesses  the factors  which are  responsible for  successful  and unsuccessful
outcomes of lending groups and credit cooperatives in different parts of
the world. The evaluation is  based on a literature  review. An attempt was
made to cover a wide range of sources and go beyond the mere experience
of Bank projects. Therefore, most projects refezenced in this paper are
not  Bank  projects  per  so,  although  some  have,  amongst  others,  also
received Bank funds.
An assessment of the factors  behind successes and failures of group
lending and credit cooperatives to derive operational guidelines is in
place because the World Bank '-s been heavily involved in the promotion
of rural.  credit. Rural credit operations accounted for  close to a quarter
of the Bank's agricultural lending, and over the period 1982-88 a total
of USS 6.59 billion was channeled through such operations. In a sample of
25 projects which involved rural  credit, 10 named, amongst others, credit
cooperatives  or lending  groups  as  participating  financial  intermediaries.  1
The Bank has thus been directly or indirectly supporting the promotion or
The nv.iber  of projects involving  credit cooperatives or borrower groups
is likely to be even higher, as certain project reports did not explicitly
mention all admissible forms  of financial intermediation.maintenance of these institutional arrangements which exist in the rural
areas of rcost  of its client countries.
The paper consists of four  parts. The next section  briefly describes
the role of lending groups and credit cooperatives in rural lending. It
is followed by a theoretical part elaborating on the basic principles
behind lending groups and credit cooperatives. The theoretical section is
followed by an empirical part reviewing experiences of group lending and
credit  cooperatives  3.n  different  parts  of  the  world.  Although  this
empirical part refers to the elaborations in the theoretical section, it
can easi'.y  be read separately. The last part summarizes the main lessons
from  these experiences and  draws some  conclusions relevant  to Bank policy.3
II.  TEE PLACE  OF LENDING  GROUPS AND CRZDIT  COOPERATIVES IN  RURAL LENDING
The small farmers, limited access  to commercial bank credit and the
high interest rates charged by non-institutional lenders were important
factors that  led governments and donors  to promote  alternative  rural
credit institutions  in  developing  countries.  In  many countries,  government
support  and  significant donor  involvement  helped  set  up  specialized
agricultural  financial  institutions  such  as  development  banks,
agricultural banks and land banks. However, the expectation that these
institutions  would provide easier access to smaller farmers has often not
materialized. The distribution of credit by government owned or sponsored
rural financial institutions has frequently been skewed in favor of the
wealthier  and  more  influential  farmers.  Furthermore,  many  of  these
institutions have not been financially viable and have either collapsed
or only been able to operate with additional infusions  of public funds.
The  agricultural  development  banks,  and  other  rural  lenders,
frequent failure  to reach low-income  producers with affordable credit has
led  to a search for  other arrangements  to achieve this objective. Lenders
associate low-income producers  with high risks and view them as potential
clients for  small loans  entailing  high administrative  costs  per unit lent.
Lending groups and credit cooperatives have been ascribed the potential
to  reach  low-income  producers  with  affordable  credit  because  the
processing of one large loan rather than numerous small loans may allow
for  savings  in  administrative  costs.  Credit  cooperatives  and  group
arrangements entail some form of joint liability and are therefore also
expected to reduce the risks of loan default.4
Despite their  apparent advantages  credit cooperatives and lending
groups have yielded  mixed results.  To determine  whether these arrangements
hold some  unrealized potential, an analysis of experiences with credit
cooperatives  and  group  lendlng  projects  is  in  place.  The  favorable
experiences  must be carefully assessed to determine  whether their success
can be attributed to specific design features and the extent of their
replicability  must  be  determined.  The  review  of  less  successful
experiences is of equal importance. If the difficulties encountered by
many  credit  cooperatives  and  lending  groups  are  due  to  general
deficiencies and shortcomings in their implementation  rather than factors
inherent to these institutions, the mixed record is not necessarily an
appropriate indicator of the potential they actually hold.
111.  ZSSNTI  CNARCTERISTICS  OF  GROUP LZNDIN
The most important elements of a group lending arrangement are the
precise form of joint liability and its enforcement, and the extent to
which  the  ultimate  lender  Lnteracts  with  the  group  as  a  whole  or
alternatively, with each individual member. Experience has further shown
that factors such as who promoted the group formation and the group,s
involvement in joint activities other than credit can also affect group
performance.
A.  Transaction  Costs  and  Lender-Group  Relationships
Regarding  the  relationship  between  the  lender  and  the  group,  two
extreme cases warrant detailed analysis. The lender  may lend to the group
as a whole,  which  then disburses  the  loan to  its  individual members5.
according to some  agreed distribution criteria. Alternatively, the lender
may lend to each member individually,  with the group jointly guaranteeing
all  loans  or  simply  furnishing  inLormation  about  the  individual
participants. If the lender lends to tn  group az a whole, he is likely
to save on transaction costs. If he is, however, responsible for group
formation,  he  may still incur significant  expenses related  to the creation
and  promotion of  groups.  Further  costs may  be  involved  in obtaining
information about group members so as to assess the likely effectiveness
of joint liability in assuring repayment. In addition, group members may
incur  significant transaction costs related to decisions on  terms and
criteria to allocate the loan among themselves and to the monitoring and
enforcement of  repayments. Thus,  it  is unclear whether  group  lending
actually  reduces  overall  transaction  costs  or  whether  it  simply
reallocates them.
Lenders are likely to v.ew a reallocation of transaction expenses
from themselves to the group as an overall reduction of these costs.
Implementors  and evaluators of group lending  programs have tended to take
the same position because labor is the group's main input. They usually
assume that the time of group members has relatively lcw value or that
group members would participate in group activities in any event. This is
not necessarily a valid assumption. If transaction costs (including the
opportunity value of time) to group members turn out to be higher than
those  which  they  would  encounter  in  other  credit  arrangements,  the
organization will not be viable in the long run. In complex cases it  is
reasonable to expect that groups will resort to rules of thumb that can
potentially economize on transaction costs related to credit allocation.6
A simple  rule could  be to allocate  the smaie amount  of credit  at equal
terms  arnd  conditioAiu  to  each  member.  This  would,  however,  be inefficient
if  group  members  dif  fer  significantly  in  resource  endowments  or  investment
opportunities.  The reduction  of transaction  costs resulting  from this
simple  rule of thumb  may be an important  element  behind the frequent
recommendation  that  group  members  should  be as similar  as possible.
If the lender  deal.  directly  with individual  group  members,  there
are fewer  opportunities  to reduce  transaction  costs.  In fact,  such loan
arrangements  have a considerable  potential  for duplication  of effort
between the lender  and the group.  The group  may, however,  still prove
useful to the lender. rt may, for example,  provide the lender  with
information  about  itself  and its individual  members.  It may also afford
some form  of joint  liability,  which  puts social  pressure  on delinquent
members  and  induces  them  to settle  overdue  dc-.!ts.  This  in  turn  m~'ay  re~duce
the  coats  of loan  collection  and increase  overall  lender  profitability.
S. Loan  Recovery  and  Joint  Liabilit
The foregoing  discussion  has  pointed  to the  crucial  importance  of
joint  liability  and its  effect  on loan  recovery.  While some  transaction
expenditures  are  incurred  by  administrative  work,  the  bulk  of  the  lender,s
costs  are  related to  the  assessment of  creditworthiness  and  the
enhancement  of loan  recovery.  Farmers  who  are  familiar  with  each  other  and
have some social or economic ties possesses an asset which is not
marketable,  but can enhance  their  prospects  as borrowers  when they are
organized in a group. Familiarity  among group members implies better
information  about the  participants,  character, farming skills, and7
consumption and investment needs. Social and economic links provide group
members  with  possioilitles  of  pressuring  their  peers  to  perform.
Familiarity and linkages among group members are negatively correlated
with group size. Large groups are  too diluted  to possess t  ie  informational
or kinship advantages whlch make such arrangements  worthwhlle for lenders
and borrowers.
Joint liability is consldured a cruclal element in the attainment
of more effectlve and less costly loan cqllection. However, a thorough
understandlng of this feature requlres careful separation of different
aspects of loan  collection. In both the group and the individual case the
key  issue  is  the  extent  of  the  lenders,  willingness  to  bear  loan
collectlon costs. In  either case  much depends on the penalties available
against  dellnquent  borrowers  and  whether  legal  and  soclal  practices  make
it  possible  to  enforce  them.  If  the  legal,  political  and  social
environment  make  joint  liabillty  a  viable  procedure,  lt is  unlikely  that
groups which are  formed by the members themselves and only deal with
activities directly related to credit will include borrowers with a high
default risk. Such  members can only impose  additlonal  costs on other group
members when jolnt liabillty  comes lnto  play. An important Lssue in  group
lendlng ls whether enforcing varLous forms of  joint llability is more
effectlve and less  costly than enforcing Lndividual liabillty.  Experience
suggests  that  full  appllcation  of  the  legal  procedures  to  obtain
repayments  is  in  most  instances  equally difficult and  costly for joint and
individual  liabillty.
Because  of  the  practleal  difficulties  lnvolved  in  enforcing
collection from  delinquent  borrowers,  providing continued  access to  credit8
on attractive terms  Ls often a morn etfectivo and  less costly way  to
encourage prompt loan repayment. A necessary condition for satisfactory
repayment  performance  under  group  lending  arrangements  is  thus  the
lender's willingness and cbility to deny future credit to whole groups
when they nr any  member fail  to repay.  Denying access to future  credit  may
not always be as simple as it  seems, especially if the lender is heavily
dependent on external sources  of funds that mandate lending  to particular
target  groups.  It  is,  however,  a  powerful  weapon  to  promote  loan
repayment. If  group activities  other than credit can also be curtailed in
came of loan default, group members are likely to exert strong pressure
to repay on their defauZ .ng peers.
It should  be noted that joint liability,  even if loosely  defined as
the notion that the whole group can be penalized for bad performance of
any  member,  can  lead to  excesnive borrowing,  from  a  social  welfare
perspective. This is  true because  the cost of default is shared while the
benefits  of  additional  liquidity  accrue  to  individuals.  This  deficiency
may,  however, be overcome by rationing credit to the socially  optimal
level.
IV.  CHARACTZRUSTICS  OF  CREDIT  COOPERATIVES
Various  types  of  cooperatives  are  engaged  in  rural  financial
activities.  Two  main  categories  can  be  distinguished,  namely  financial
cooperatives  whose  primary  business  is  funds  intermediation,  and
agricultural  cooperatives  who  are  primarily  engaged  in  the  provision  of
agricultural  services  or  joint  production,  but  may  offer  credit  as  an
adjunct  to  these functions.  Financial  cooperatives  can further be dividel9
xnto  relatively small, savings-funded  credit unions, government sponsored
credit cooperatives and cooperative banks. In many developing  countries
credit unions  are not r.-ognized as formal financial institutions and
consequently lack access to central banking sorvices.
The  present  discussion  covers  all  agricultural  cooperatives
providing financial services to farmers, but highlights the differences
where these are pertinent to strengths and weaknesses.
Credit  cooperaoives  as  formal financial  instttutions  had  their
origin in 19th century  Germany. This innovative financial institutlon  was
initiated by R.W. Raiffeisen, the mayor of a  provincial town, who was
motivated by concerns for the poorer segments of his constituency. The
Raiffeisen rural credit union model was based on membership and equity
contribution of  the wealthy  as well  as the poor,  on  unlimited  joint
liability  and on  voluntary leadership,  typically  by wealthier  members. The
involvement  of  wealthy  and  respectable  individuals  helped  to  create
confidence with outside sources of funds.  Over time, the unlimited joint
liability feature was modified, as it was recognized that it acted as a
deterrent  for  wealthier  individuals.
Cooperatives  are  operated  democratically  with  each  member  having  one
vote.  Equity  is  contributed  by  members  and  leadership  is  voluntary  and
unpaid,  although  professionals  can  be  hired  for  day-to-day  administration
and  management.  To  become  a  member  of  a  credit  cooperative,  a  small
initiation  fee  is  paid  together  with  an  initial  capital  contribution;  to
remain  an  active  member,  regular  capital  contributions  must  be  made.  These
contributions  do  not  only provide  the institution  with its  capital but  are
also  the  basis  upon  which  the  amount  that  a  member  can  borrow  is10
determined. Most cooperatives allow members to borrow from three to five
times the amount of their capital contribution. Cooperative profits are
distributed to their membors in form of dividends based on their equity
contribution or are retained to increase the capital base.  This insures
that benefits accruing from financial intermediation  go to members rather
than  external  intermediaries  and  their  shareholders.
Due  to  the  capital  contribution  requirement,  effective  interest
rates on loans are higher than stated rates (except in the very unusual
case where the dividend payout rate is equal to or higher than the stated
interest rate). Effective interest rates on loans may also be increased
by requirements to capitalize a portion of the loan (typically 5 or 10
percent) or by  fees and commissions similar to those charged by other
lenders.  A  cooperative  with  liquidity  shortage  may  have  to  ration  the
available credit, thus reducing the amount that members can  borrow in
relation to their paid-in capital. This, of course, also raises effective
interest  rates on loans and  thereby reduces  demand for  credit; but it  does
nothing to increase the supply of funds available for lending.
While  credit  cooperatives  are  typically  initiated with  capital
contributions from their members, they may also mobilize deposits.  Most
pure credit unions are very active in this area and the lion's share of
their  funds  for  loans  come  from member  deposits  and  share  capital.
Reliance on  self-financing is obviously  a  source of  strength,  as  it
enhances the perception  among members that they  have  a  stake  in the
institution, and thus contributes to good repayment performance.  Other
credit cooperatives frequently depend on external funds.  These can come
from commercial sources such as private banks, but more often they are11
from apex  institutions  or  development  banks  which  have in turn obtained
them  from  governments  or  international  donor  agencies.
Credit  cooperatives  rely  on  credit  comm-ittees  to  approve  loans.
Procensing time and transaction costs vary significantly across regions
and  countries.  Likewise, cooperatives  may require  no  collateral, cosigners
only, or fully-documented mortgages. Unlike banks, cooperatives usually
offer automatic loans that are approved and disbursed almost immediately
and may amount up to 90 percent of a member's capital contribution. This
is  facilitated  by  the  fact  that  the  loan  is  fully  secured  by  the
borrower's equity contribution.
The  following  section  discusses  potential  advantages  and
disadvantages of rural credit cooperatives.
(i)  Technical economies of  scale: A cooperative provides  financial
intermediation  services  at  a  local  level,  thereby  saving  members
significant transaction costs, as they would otherwise have to spend time
traveling to urban or regional centers where bank branches are located.
Similarly, transaction costs to external lenders may be reduced, as they
interact with the cooperative as a whole rather than with its individual
members.
(ii) Provision of financial services to otherwise neglected segments of
the population:  Credit cooperative can offer institutional  financial
services  to people who would  otherwise not have  access to them. Commercial
and agricultural banks are often not willing to service small savers and
borrowers because the amounts involved are too modest in relation to the12
entailed overhead costs. Credit cooperatives, however, can often provide
these and other services (e.g.  insurance)  as they are based on membership
participation, voluntary leadership and efficient intermediation between
savers and borrowers at the local level.
(iii)  Familiarity  between cooperative management  and members:  Because
cooperatives are local institutions, management and staff are familiar
with  the  members  and  can  base  lending  decisions  on  more  accurate
information  than  other institutional  lenders.  Close  ties amona members  can
also enhance the incentive to repay debts, as potential delinquents feel
responsible  towards their  peers  whose funds  are  at stake.  Similarly, these
links can add a dimension of community pressure on delinquent borrowers,
thus reducing the incidence of default.
(iv) Improved bargaining position:  Credit cooperatives  which  want  to
borrow  from  external  sources  can  increase  their  attractiveness  as
borrowers  to external lenders  because  members pool  their demand for  credit
and contribute equity to the enterprise. Their advantage stems from a
lower  default risk due to the  members, shared  obligation to repay the debt
to the external lender and savings on the external lender's transaction
costs. These aspects, similar to those entailed by group lending, give
cooperative members  access to external credit on  better terms  and in
greater volume than they would have as individuals.
(v)  Risk  pooling through  joint liability:  Like group lending  operations,
credit cooperatives can help reduce default risk through joint  liability.13
Larger membership enhances the risk reduction effect of joint liability
(if members' activities are not highly correlated), but it may dilute
other advantages of credit cooperatives such  au close familiarity between
management and  members. External lenders  trying  to enforce joint liability
upon  credit  cooperatives  face  the  same  practical  problems  as  they  do  with
group  lending.  Therefore,  external  lenders'  denial  of  future  credit  to  the
cooperative  is  again  a  potential  penalty  of  considerable  importance.
Some  of  the above advantages can be enhanced when the cooperative
is  also involved in joint  activities  other than credit, such as  marketing.
Delinquency on  repayment can, for example, be penalized  by denial of
access to cheaper  inputs which the cooperative obtains as a wholesale
buyer. If the nature of the main product produced by members  requires
joint  marketing the farmers'  debts can be settled when sales revenues are
collected. In these cases, a member's repayment  behavior will be affected
by considerations  beyond the interaction  on credit  alone. External lenders
will also recognize these advantages and the image of the cooperative as
a  viable  financial  intermediary  will  improve.
The  cooperative  structure  entails  not  only  advantages,  but  also
potential  weaknesses  which  in  part  overlap  with  those  present  in  group
lending. The  following section discusses some of  these weaknesses and
possible countermeasures:
(i)  "Moral hazard" behavior: Under a system of  risk sharing through
joint liability, all members of a cooperative share the cost entailed by
the default of any member (Braverman and Guasch, 1988). The social cost
of individual default thus exceeda its private costs. In the absence of14
effective enforcement mechanisms this may lead to a higher incidence of
defaults, which, if not effectively penalized, will be imitated by other
members, thus  bringing about the  demise of  the institution.  The other side
of the coin is a tendency of individual members to borrow more than is
socially optimal. Likewise, they may undertake riskier activities than is
optimal because the down-side risk is shared. Enforcement of loans and
penalization of default,  even when potentially feasible,  may not actually
be  pursued  in  smaller  cooperatives.  This  problem  can  arise  if  the
management  is  linked to the  defaulters  in other  ways  (e.g. kinship,
political affiliation) and is therefore reluctant to antagonize them.
Thus,  although  familiarity  between  cooperative  management  and  its
membership in  smaller  cooperatives  can be an important  asset in  developing
a  good loan portfolio, Lt can also be a source of weakness.
(ii)  Inadequate  administrative  ability:  The  democratic  principle  of
credit  cooperatives  may  bring  unqualified  individuals  to  leadership
positions.  Many  cooperatives  recognize  this problem  and hire financial  and
administrative staff with better qualifications. However, when properly
qualified personnel is to be employed, administrative costs are higher.
From a social welfare point of view it  might be more efficient to employ
this personnel in  an organization handling larger volumes  of transactions
(such  as a bank). Because  the elected leadership is often not well versed
in  financial  and  administrative  procedures  and  the  hired  non-member
professionals  have to  deal with  magnitudes much larger  than members  of the
leadership have ever experienced, cooperatives are  exposed to  another
source of "moral hazard":  hired employees, who do not have social kinship15
with cooperative members may  be tempted to take illegal advantage  of their
situat-.on.  Such tendencies can  be checked by  an efficient auditing system,
which,  because  of  economies  of  scale,  should  reside  with  a
super-cooperative organization.
(iii)  Corcentration of the portfolio: The very nature of rural credit
cooperatives as a local organization consisting of individuals who live
in geographical proximity and engage, most likely, in almost identical
economic  activities  impliez a high degree  of  covariation  in members'
liquidity and !ncomes. This factor may be of little significance in a
low-risk  environment,  but as agricultural  production is  subject  to various
risks, it has significant implications for rural credit cooperatives. If
membership  in  a  local  credit  cooperative  is  limited  to  individuals
engaging  in the same  or very similar activities the loan pcrtfolio is
likely to suffer from inadequate diversification. In addition, cash in-
and outflows are synchronized,  which may lead  to liquidity  bottlenecks at
the beginning of  the agricultural  production cycle.  These arguments  would
suggest larger,  community-based  credit  cooperatives  with  mixed  membership.
Homogeneity is  thus  not necessarily  a desirable  attribute for  rural credit
cooperatives. This distinguishes them quite clearly from lending groups
where homogeneity is rather essential for success. The handicap of larger
and more heterogeneous cooperatives, of course, is that the cooperative
leadership  will be less familiar  with the individual members and may thus
lose one of  its major assets with regard to efficient and facilitated
lending decisions.16
An institutional solution  to the problems of synchronized  cashf  lows
and  limited  risk  diversification  is  the  creation  of  a  nation-  or
regionwide apex organization where various cooperatives share membership
and  equity.  Thanks  to  its  wider  geographical  coverage  the  apex
organization  can  benefit  from  greater  risk  diversifi-ation  and  a  more
balanced cash profile.  These advantages enable the apex organization to
act  as a lender  of last  resort, helping  its individual  member cooperatives
overcome liquidity bottlenecks. Although the apex organization is likely
to  have  a  more  diversified  membership,  local  cooperatives  may  still  want
to  aim  for members of  varied backgrounds to  increase their base  for
deposit mobilization. Thanks to its  increased size the apex organization
can also afford economies of scale in services which would be too costly
or inefficient  for  individual  cooperatives, for  example staff  training  and
auditing.  Given the larger  volume  of funds  involved  and the greater  degree
of diversification, the apex organization can also acquire outside funds
at more advantageous terms than its individual members.17
V. EXPERIENCE WITH GROUP LENDXNG
As  highlighted  by  the  previous  section,  group  lending  has  two
potential advantages over lending  to individual farmers: it can reduce
transaction costs for borrowers and lenders, and improve repayment rates
through  joint  responsibility  and  peer  pressure  among  group  members.
Consequently, group lending can enable a  largor number of small  farmers
to be serviced with credit from institutional lenders.
This  section  discusse. whether  and  under  what  conditions  these
pctential advantages of group lending have materialized in a number of
group lending schemes.
A. Group Formation
Several studies suggest that the performance of a group  lending
scheme depends much on the way groups are formed, relationships among
group members  and the  functions and responsibilities  a  lending group
assumes.  In many countries the costs of group formation and technical
assistance have been borne by government organizations such as extension
agencies, and lenders  have thus been freed from group formation expenses.
In other cases, such as the group lending schemes in  Ghana, the Dominican
Republic,  Thailand and the  Grameen Bank in  Bangladesh, group formation has
been left to the initiative of the borrowers who also bear the related
costs. only rarely have  lenders themselves assumed the  administrative
costs of forming  borrowing groups. Where this has been the case, like for
example in Nepal, an attempt has been made to keep group formation costs
low  by making loans  through existing village organizations or traditional
informal groups. Use of these same channels has also kept group formation18
costs low in Malawi, where groups are formed with the help of extension
agents. Group formation along  communal and kinship lines is also believed
to be at the source of low default rates in this country.
A crucial feature  for  adequate  performance of group schemes is  group
size. Small size permits closer ties among members and can reduce costs
of information  within the group. It also facilitates loan supervision and
increases the groups  ability to impose accountability on its members.
Practice has shown that group size is directly related to delinquency
rates. In  Ghana, large  groups  with close  to 100  members performed  markedly
worse than small groups of 10 or 20. Similarly, in the Dominican Republic
loan recovery rates decreased significantly as group sizes increased. In
Zimbabwe, groups of 20 or more proved more susceptible to default than
smaller groups. A successful group lending program of the Thai Bank for
Agriculture and Agricultural  Cooperatives (BAAC) limited  group membership
to 30 at the most, but typically groups  consisted of  12  to 15  members. The
Bangladesh  Grameen Bank, with a loan recovery  rate of over 98%, found that
even groups of ten persons proved too large to guarantee cohesiveness and
joint  responsibility among  members. Consequently it limited  group size to
five. It is obviously questionable whether very small groups allow for
much scale economies  and cut down  on transaction costs.  On the  other hand,
as the Grameen Bank example shows, joint liability is  more easily imposed
upon small  groups. Sinr-e  their repayment  rates  are generally higher,  total
lending costs are significantly reduced. Increasing group size is often
a  result of  deteriorating credit  services. If  the intermediary's  financial
situation no longer allows to service a large number of groups, while
demand for  credit remains  unchanged, group  size inevitably increases.  This19
in  turn  affects  loan  repayment  rates  and  further  worsens  the
intermediary's  situation.  This  vicious  circle  must  be  prevented  by
allowing  the  financial  intermediary  to  maintain  a  sound  financial
situation through full cost recovery.
Besides  size, group  homogeneity has proved to  be  important for
effective group guarantee of loans and supervision of loan utilization.
In Malawi and some areas of Bangladesh, where group lending has performed
exceptionally well, loans are only made to relatively homogeneous groups.
In Malawi groups are always from the same village and within the village
they are often further affiliated through kinship. The Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh makes only loans to groups from the same village, consisting
of mem=ers of the same sex with a similar economic background. The Thai
BAAC group lending scheme only lends to homogeneous groups which engage
in  the production of the same  crops. An example of where lending to large
groups based on administrative definition rather than social  coher on has
failed, is  the smallholder lending  program in  Madagascar. In  this program
loans were channelled through the "fokontanyR (the lowest level of local
government) and access to new funds  was denied to the whole entity if the
repayment rate fell  below 95%. It  was soon found  that the  guarantee of the
fokontanysd  was meaningless and unenforceable. Loan delinquency almost
always exceeded the allowed quota so that only very few groups remained
eligible after a few years and the program had to be abandoned.
Management  of  individual borrowing  groups  is a  further crucial
aspect of a well functioning group lending scheme. Self-managed groups
have generally performed better than groups whose activities were fully
managed  by  outsiders  such  as  extension  agents  or  personnel  of  the20
financial intermediary.  To the extent that groups have qualified members,
self-management with respect to information  gathering, loan supervision,
collection, recording  and  treasury functions  also  allow  to reduce lendersI
transaction costs, although they add to the borrowers' transaction costs.
Adequate training is, however, important if a  borrowing group is expected
to assume managerial responsibilities. in this respect the Grameen Bank
Project goes through painstaking measures, with each newly formed group
receiving seven days of continuous training by a bank worker. Following
this training, groups meet weekly in a local center consisting of about
five  groups.  Loan  applications  and  other  administrative  duties  are
processee through these centers. Bank workers continue to work with the
centers a..d  groups  throughout  the period  of outstanding loans.  Due to this
thorough training,  transaction costS  to  the  lender and borrowers  are
relatively  high,  but  they  seem  to  be  essential  for  the  bank's  good
performan'-e.  To  the  extent  that  the  same  group  borrows  repeatedly,
transaction  costs  should,  however,  decrease  over  time.  While  no
quantitative information of transaction costs to borrowers is available,
the  Grameen Bank's administrative  costs (including  provision for  bad  debt)
amounted to 18.1%  of outstanding loans  in 1986,  with total operating  costs
(administrative  costs plus borrowing costs) extending to 21.7% (Hossain,
1988) 2,3
2  As a comparison, administrative costs of loans to small-scale farmers
in  the Philippines were found  to vary between 3% and 10% of the amount lent.  The
same costs for the Jamaican Development Bank were estimated at ll.  ,  and at
26.3% for  the National  Agricultural Development  Bank in  Honduras (Cuevas,  1984).
It is not clear whether these comparative figures include depreciation costs
and provision for bad debts.
Operating costs as a share of total amount of funds (i.e.  total liabilities) in
the Grameen  Bank ran at 6.5% and 6.7% in 1985 and 1986 respectively. These
figures amounted to 6.2% and 6.4% when depreciation and provision of bad debts
were netted out.  A study  of other Bangladesh  banks making loans  to small farmers
came up with figures  varying  between 0.9% and 3.9% for 1985 (net  of depreciation
and provision for bad debts). However, all of these banks faced severe lcan21
Finally, previous experience with group activities in general and
with group lending in  particular, also seems  to have a positive effect on
group lending performance. To the extent that groups are formed by group
members themselves, it is conceivable that previous experience allows to
identify members  with  good  repayment  records  and  exclude  others.  In
Zimbabwe, for example, it was found that groups which had been formed
earlier for purposes other than credit, and borrowing groups which had
existed for a certain period of time, performed better than newly formed
credit groups. In  Malawi, where credit  groups are newly formed every year,
group credit was preceded by group input supply so that  farmers were
already  familiar with group  activities before the  credit program  was
launched.
B. Liability and Loan Recoverv
Loans can either be made to the group as a whole or to individuals
with the group acting as a conduit or a guarantor. If the loan is made
directly  to  individuals,  liability can  take  one  of  three  forms.  If
individual liability prevails, individual group ne  Abers bear the  sole
responsibility for repayment of their loan and the gx:oup  acts only as a
conduit who can  either provide the lender with information about  its
recovery  problems, with total recovery five  years after due date averaging only
60%  (compared to  98.6%  after  two  years  of  issue  for  the  Grameen  Bank).
(Srinivasan,  1987).
3  It should  be  noted that  part  of these  relatively  high  costs reflect  costs
incurred by the rapid expansion of the Grameen Bank during this time. Hossain
(1988) has estimated that nearly half of the existing administration costs may
be due to  start-up costs, which should be phased out once the new branches
operate at full capacity.22
members or assist its participants with loan application. In the case of
joint  voluntary  liability,  individuals  are  only  responsible  for  the
repayment of their own loan, but all group members are denied access to
future loans if one or several group members fail to repay. In the case
of mandatory  joint liability, each group member is responsible for the
repayment of all loans made to group members and access to new loans is
denied  to everybody as long  as not  all outstanding loans have  been repaid.
Mandatory joint liability normally prevails if the loan is made to the
group as a whole.  Experience does not clearly indicate whether lending
to individuals  or lending to a group as a whole yields better results. On
the other hand,  practice has  shown that  joint liability haa positive
effects on loan repayments if certain conditions are met. In Bangladesh
and  Malawi,  where  loan  recovery  rates  have  been  98.6%  and  97.4%
respectively, loans  have been  made to and  must be repaid by the irdividual
(Hosaain, 19881 Schaefer-KRhnert, 1983). However, the group is jointly
liable for default by any of its members and future access to credit is
denied to the entire group in case of default. The BAAC's program in
ThaLland has achLeved repayment rates of 82% (vs.  an average rate of 66%
for comparable loans  wlth individual liability)  by lending  to individnals
under  mandatory  joint liability.  Its experience  has  also  shown  that
lending  to groups  collectively  results in  higher  default rates  because no-
one  accepts  responsibilLty  (Tohtong,  1988).  A  comparative  study  of
different group lending  schemes in Zimbabwe  has found  that in  normal years
current recovery rates for loans made to a group were up to 40% higher
(92%  vs 53%)  than those of loans to Lndividuals  and up to 20% higher than23
those for loans to individuals with joint liability (Bratton, 1986)
However, thls trend  was completely reversed  in  a  year  of exceptionally bad
harvests. Loania  made to a group  as a whole then performed worst. This
seems  to suggest that under unlimited liability borrowers are only likely
to repay if they believe that  the majority  of their fellow  members  will
also  repay.  If an  individual  repays while  the  majority  of  the  group
defaults, he or she  would be made worse off by having  paid their share and
subsequently also being responsible for the share of delinquents.
Regardless of whether loans are made to groups or individuals, all
group  lending  projects reviewed impose  some form  of joint liability  on the
group  as  a whole.  In certain cases  liability  is limited to denial of
future  access  to  credit,  in  others liability is unlimited and eatch  member
in  formally responsible  for  all  outstanding  loans  made  to  the  group.  In
practice,  however,  enforcement  of  payment  in  joint  liability  programs  has
been  difficult,  and  the  common  course  of  action  has  been  denial  of  future
access  to  credit.  Zxperience  has  shown  that  this  threat  only  works  as  long
as  the  lender  is  in  a  position  to  provide  access  to  favorable  and timely
credit  services  in  the  future.  In  Bolivia,  the  Philippines  and  the
Dominican Republic, for example, loan delinquencies increased rapidly as
lenders'  services deteriorated and  became less timely. In  contrast, where
access to future credit has been assured, groups have often been found to
put significant pressure on their defaulting peers. In some cases intra-
group lending has been used to assure timely repayment. This has often
been the case in  the  Grameen  Bank  program,  where  credit  is  given  to  group
4More  specific  detail  on  similarity of loan size, risk, and credit use
is, however, not available.24
members in  different stages,  with subsequent  members only receiving their
share after  their predecessor has  been  satisfactorily repaying  for a
certain  period of time.
Group  members  are  believed  to  have  a  further  incentive  to  repay
their  debts  if  a  common  interest  other  than  credit  is  also  at  stake.
Evidence  to  substantiate  this  claim  is  scant,  because groups are  generally
formed  for  the  sole  purpose  of  getting  access  to  credit.  In  Bangladesh,
Zalawi  and  Nepal  a  common  interest  has  been  created  by  retaining  between
5%  and  10%  of  the  total  value  of  the  group  loan  as  a  deposit.  While  this
capitalization  increases  effective  interest  rates  on  the  loan,  the
deposits  earn  interest  and  can  be  used  to  cover  shortfalls  in  the
repayment of the  group's loan.  In  Malawi  and  Nepal  the  entire deposit plus
accrued interest is returned to the groap upon repayment of the entire
debt. In Bangladesh only part of these forced savings is returned to the
group after repayment of the debt. In times of need, group members are
entitled to borrow up to 50%  of this deposit as an interest free loan for
specific purposes. This is  believed to protect loan  quality by preventing
members  from  liquidatlng  their  capital  or  going  to  informal  lenders  in
times  of  need.  To  judge  from  the  relatively  high  repayment  rates  in  these
countries'  group  lending  schemes,  the  organizational  good  created  from
this forced savings function seems to work effectively. A group lending
program in the Philippines creates a common interest  by having a group of
small grain producers pledging their crop against  the group's loan. While
the program is still at its initiating  stage, repayment rates have so far
been outstanding at 99.7%.25
Finally,  the  Grameen Bank's  experience  also suggests  that loans  made
to rural poor are more easily recovered if they are collected in regular
(even weekly)  small amounts suitable to the circumstances under  which
these people earn and live.  This approach  may, however,  have to be adapted
to constraints imposed by production cycles. The provedure is also likely
to  increase  transaction  costs  for both borrowers and  lenders, but the
advantages  of  significantly  higher  recovery  rates  must  be  considered
against  these  drawbacks.
C.  Reduced  Lenders*  Costs
While  improved  loan  recovery  rates  are  the  crucial  factor  In  cutting
down  lenders'  costs  and  risks,  reduced  administrative  costs  due  to  scale
economies  are  further  expected  to  limit  lender  transaction  costs.  If
functions  such  as  loan  application,  information  gathering  on  potential
borrowers,  loan  supervision  and  collection  can  be  passed  from  the  lender
to the borrowing group the lenders' administrative  costs are likely to be
reduced. This in turn would enhance more lenders to make credit available
under similar conditions and  hence, the number of  small farmers with
access to credit would increase. Review of a sample of 15 group lending
projects does not provide a clear-cut answer in this regard. From the
reports  which  provided  information  on  transaction  costs,  it  can  be
concluded that lenders in the Philippines, India, Nepal, Bolivia and the
Dominican  Republic  benefitted from  scale  economies in  administrative costs
when making loans to groups. However, in most cases this was only true
because lenders were not required to carry group formation costs. In the
Dominican Republic these were borne by the refinancing agency, while in26
Bolivia, Ghana, Malawi, Thailand, Bangladesh and Nepal the  government
provided technical services related  to group formation. The most striking
example  with  regard  to  group  formation  costs  is  the  Zimbabwe
Agricultural  Finance  Corporation's  (AFC)  group  lending  scheme.  This
program  only  lends to groups that were formed  and  formerly  involved  in
another  group  lending  program  with  limited  liability.  The  AFC's
administrative costs for its group lending scheme are minuscule  (1% of
loan capital) compared to the costs of the group  'ending scheme where
groups have to be formed and  costs of lending  tr individual small farmers
(12%  and 11%  of loan capital,  respectively). In  fact,  administrative costs
of  lending to groups  of  small farmers compare  favorably to those  of
lending to  large-scale commercial  farmers  (Bratton, 1986). AFC's  low
administrative costs in the  group  lending  scheme  suggest  that  subsequent
to  startup  costs  associated  with  group  formation,  group  lending  programs
become much  more advantageous in  terms of  decreased administrative  costs.
D. Borrowers' Costs
Except from India and the Phiiippines, all group lending studies
which reported information on borrowers, costs indicated that borrowers
incurred lower costs when borrowing as a group member rather  than as
individuals.  For  example, a  comparative study  of  borrowing expenses in  the
Dominican  Republic  found  that  the  effective  rate  of  borrowing  costs  on  an
annual  basis  was  15%  for  a  group  and  18%  for  individual  borrowers (Adams,
et.al.  1981).  Generally,  group  borrowers  enjoyed  advantages  of  savings  on
fees  for  collateral  registration,  expenses  on  certificates  needed  for  loan
application  and  on  time  and transportation costs of visiting lenders. It27
must  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that  group  leaders may  incur
administrative  costs  and  time  loss  that  ar-  not  accounted  for  in  monetary
terms.  In  addition,  costs  to individual  group  members  may outweigh  costs
of individual  borrowing  if certain  member-  default  and others  are held
liable  for their share.  None of the reviewed  studies  provided  data on
these  costs.28
VI *PZRISZNMC  WITH CRBDIT COOPERATIVES IN  LDCS
Like group  lending,  credit  cooperatives  are  expected  to  have two
distinctive advantages  over  other financial  institutions  involved  in  rural
lending: transaction costs to borrowers and lenders can be reduced and
repayment rates increased.  In addition, local credit cooperatives can
offer their members a wider range of services (relating  to both savings
and  credit)  than  other  financial  institutions  or  informal  lenders.
Unfortunately, the  literature on credit cooperatives  in LDCs provides
rather scant information  about  such  crucial  elements as  operating expenses
and transaction costs to borrowers, lenders and savers.
overall, the record of credit cooperatives as an  instrument for
development  of  rural  finance  has been  mixed.  High  delinquency  rates  may
be the major reason for failure in unsuccessful credit cooperatives, but
they should  be viewed as a symptom rather  than the underlying cause of the
failure  . Areas  of  particular  importance  for  successful  credit
cooperatives include:
(1)  adequate planning and education of members;
(2)  organizational and structural issues, such as clear division of
responsibilities between primary and secondary organizations;
(3)  availability of  supporting infrastructure, proper management and
oversight;
For  example,  in  Thailand  over  50%  of  loans  made  through  credit
cooperatives have been in  arrears between 1981 and 1986, while the arrears rate
of loans  made to individual farmers has varied between 10% and 30% (around 10%
of long  term loans,  20% short term loans, 30%  medium term loans)  during the same
time  period  (BAAC, Annual  Report,  1986). Similarly,  in  India,  the  credit
cooperatives system  has suffered  from low  recovery  rates oscillating  around 50%.
(The  World Bank, SAR, Nabard Credit Project, 1986).29
(4)  avoiding inappropriate governmental interference.
Below we examine each one of these points in light ot experiences
in different countries.
A.  Importance of Adeouate Planning and  Education
Membership participation is one of the cornerstones of self-help
organizations.  Active  member involvement  is  required  to foster  institution
building at the local level,  which in  turn is expected to promote economic
self-sufficiency among members. In order to undc-stand the principle-of
self-help, and the rationale behind credit cooperatives in particular,
cooperative  members  must  comprehend  that  they  can  benefit  from
organization and collective action. The  establishment of a cooperative is
easier  in  an  environment  generally  supportive  of  cooperation  and
collective action.  As was pointed out in the section about group lending,
cohesion among participants is  easier to achieve with limited  membership,
a restricted field of action and the rarticipants, active involvement in
the decision making process. These principles were very much followed at
the  initial  stage  of  credit  unions  in  industrialized  market  economies.  The
Raiffeisen  model  built  upon  small  membership,  a  limited  field  of  action,
voluntary  management  and  unlimited  liability.  The movement clearly drew
its initial  strength from  spontaneous  and  voluntary initiatives  of farmers
and leading citizens who were willing to act as organizers and managers.
The expansion of these credit cooperatives came gradually. Only when they
got  involved in input supply and marketing were  limited liability and
full-time paid managers introduced (Schaefer-Kehnert  et.al., 1986).30
Promotion  of  cooperatives  can  be carried out by three  different
sectors,  namely  the  government,  non-governmental  organizations  or  the
cooperative sector itself.  Regardless of what agent takes  the  initiative
to promote the cooperative, the members' felt need and self-reliance are
essential to success. In many developing countries the government  has
taken upon  itself the initiative to organize farmers in cooperatives.
Instead of starting out with a single purpose cooperative, such as, for
example, a credit union, governments have often immediately launched a
comprehensive multipurpose cooperative offering input supply, as well as
marketing and financial services.  What has been ignored during these
ambitious initi.  tives is  that top-down  imposition  of such  enterprises also
involves top-down decision making  and exclusion  of  active membership
participation. It is hard to imagine that cooperative members will take
an active interest Ln these organizations and view them as more than just
suppliers of chedp services  unless they experience a sense of ownership.
Furthermore, management  of these large enterprises  often prohibits direct
contacts  between  leadership  and  members  at  the  primary  level.
Consequently, a  personal  relatLonship  of  confldence  between  the leadership
and members can not develop. This relationship, however, is crucial for
the well functioning of a credit cooperative. Members' confidence in the
management is needed  to  mobilize savings  and encourage  loan repayment.  The
management's  knowledge of  members. situations, on the  other  hand,  is
essential  in the appraisal of creditworthiness. Further, if credit  is
provided Ln conjunction with other benefits, such as subsidized inputs,
farmers often fail to understand that tiey are beneficiaries of a loan
rather than a grant. This evidently has a detrimental effect on  loan31
repayment rates and will eventually affect the financial  viability of the
cooperative. Many of these government-established cooperatives have only
been  able  to  survive  with  the  help  of  a  large  influx  of outs'.de  funds.
This  in turn has precluded a sense of joint ownership and peer pressure
from working as a driving force behind loan repayments, as cooperative
members  did  not  see  their  own  capital  at  stake.
Reports  of  malfunctioning  cooperatives  which  were  subject  to  top-
down  organizations  and  decision  making  are  numerous.  A  study  on
cooperatives  in  Southeast  Asia,  for example, claims that  insufficient
preparation  of  members,  especially  the  absence  of  a  sense  of  ownership
amor,'  members,  has  been  one  of  the  major  reasons  of  failed  cooperatives
in  I.dia,  Thailand  and  the  Philippines (FAO,1986). Similarly in Jordan,
cooperative  members  have  :ittle  sense  of  ownership  and  responsibility
because theLr managers are  appointed  by  the  government.  The  relatively
poor  performance  of  credit  cooperatives  in  Pakistan  has  been  largely
attributed  to  the  fact  that  government  workers,  rather  than  cooperative
managers,  appraise  and  collect  loans.  A  striking  example,  which  indicates
that  the  functioning  of  credit cooperatives depends on the way the system
is  organized  and  promoted  comes  from  Malawi. In response to the complete
breakdown  of  the  Malawi  multipurpose  cooperative  system,  the  previously
discussed  group  lending  program was launched and resulted  in  one  of  the
most  successful  programs  of  its kind.
This  is,  however,  not  to  say  that government support is unnecessary
for  the  development  of  the  cooperative  movement.  Most  failures  of
government-promoted  cooperatives  have  been  due  to  the  fact  that
governments  were  not  prepared  to  accept  the  long  gestation  period32
necessary for  cooperative  development.  The South  Korean  cooperative system
is an example where  top-down promotion of the movement  and  effective
government support have yielded excellent results. It must, however, be
noted  that the Koreans have had a long  tradition  of group organization and
responsibility  for  savings,  credits  and  other  purposes  before  the
cooperative system was launched  by the national government. Furthermore,
a war and two landreforms had eliminated major wealth differences within
the rural population. In addition,  the Korean  movement was put forth  with
enormous educational campaigns at the member as well as the managerial
level. A bottom-up built credit union movement developed parallel to and
independently of the  government launched cooperative  system. As  these
bottom-up organizations grew rapidly and were  very  successful in lending
and savings  mobilization, the  government-launched  cooperatives eventually
adopted methods similar to those of the credit unions in dealing with
rural credit and savings  mobilization.
Lacking  comprehension  of the  cooperative  system's  principles  has not
been  limited  to member  participants.  In  fact,  there  has  often  been
significant  confusion within governments  and international  donor agencies
about the nature of credit cooperatives as viable financial institutions.
Although  cooperative  profits  are  redistributed  to  the  participating
members rather  than outside stockholders,  cooperatives should nonetheless
aim at adequate profitability. Confusion about the profit-making nature
of credit cooperatives results not only from the different ways in which
profits  can be distributed,  but also from  the discourse  that is  often used
to  promote  the cooperative  movement  in  developing  countries. This  rhetoric
ignores the  effect  of  individual self-interest which  often motivates33
membership  in  a  credit  cooperative.  Thus,  it  has  b-en  widely  believed
that  a  sense  of  community  responsibility  will  entice  members  to  work  for
the  cooperative voluntarily and without pay  over a  long period. This
belief has impeded  a careful  examination  of the incentives  that frequently
motivate members  to participate in  cooperative  activities.  In  particular,
the  board  of  directors  and  the  credit  committee  almost  always  play
important and time-consuming roles in the management of a cooperative.
It would therefore not be surprising to find that the  individuals who
participate  in  these  activities  capture  a  disproportionate  share  of
benefits as implicit compensation for their voluntary labor.  Often, the
desire  to  keep  costs  at  low  levels has  also  made  it  difficult  for
cooperatives  to  pay  adequate  salaries  to  secure  and  retain  skilled
managers. This problem is especially pertinent when such salaries appear
high relative to the incomes of cooperative members in other leadership
positions.
Cooperative  rhetoric  may  also  have  prevented  some  credit
cooperatives  from  charging  adequate interest rates on their loans, even
when  those  were  not  government controlled.  For  example,  it  has been
reported  that  credit  cooperatives  in  Peru  and  Togo  have  charged  interest
rates at least 10% below what would have been required to cover their
operating  costs  and  pay  competitive rates  on  theLr  members,  savings
deposits.  As  a  result,  Peruvian  credit  cooperatives  could  not  secure
enough  savings  to  satisfy  the  demand  for  cheap  credit,  which  in  turn  had
to  be  rationed.  This  led  to a  decline in  active membership and to serious
repayment problems, as members saw no point in repaying old loans when34
prospects for obtaining new credit were bleak.  Another factor inducing
delinquency was the high rate of inflation prevailing at the time.
B. Organizational and Structural Issues
Most  credit  cooperatives are organized  in a two-  or  three-tier
system, with a federation  of national or regional cooperatives at the top
and the  local (primary) organization providing services to  individual
members at the bottom. Regional or national umbrella organizations have
a  good potential  because they  can benefit from larger scale  economies than
their  primary  associations and  contribute  to  risk  reduction  through
portfolio  diversification.  In  many  countries  apex  institutions  have
successfully  assisted  their  primary  organizations  with  managerial,
auditing and  educational  tasks. Iin  numerous  countries the  apex institution
acts also as financial intermediary providing liquidity management and
intermediary services to  its member organizations. In South Korea the
national organization also plays an important role in assisting primary
organizations  with  investments  outside  the  agricultural  sector.  In
addition, it provides its member associations with excellent auditing
services.  However,  problems have  arisen  in cases  where  the  umbrella
organization  has  directly  provided  financial  services  to  individual
customers  and the roles  of the secondary  and primary  organization  were not
clearly defined.  In Bolivia,  for example, the  national organization,
FENACRE,  has begun to  make loans  directly  to individuals  with funding from
an  international  organization.  It  has  also  engaged  in  deposit
mobilization, directly competing  with its primary associations.  In Niger
and Honduras, the lack of clearly divided responsibilities between local35
associations  and  the  umbrella  organization  introduced  greater
possibilities of nonrepayment, as it was in many cases not clear who was
responsible for allocation ar.d  collection efforts (Cuevas et. al, 1988;
Vogel, 1988).
Heavy  financial  inter-reliance  of  first  and  second  order
organizations  can  also  entice  moral  hazard  behavior  among  borrowing
as3ociations who tend to overborrow and engage in riskier undertakings
than they would if they could not rely on the apex for funds. This was
found to be the case for  many primary cooperatives in Israel, where loans
from regional organizations were the single most important liability of
numerous  primary  cooperatives.  That  many  local  organizations  had
overborrowed and the financial  health of regional organizations rose and
fell  with  the  economic  performance  of  thelr  members  became  clear  when
funds  became  scarce  at  the  macro-level  and  real  interest  rates  skyrocketed
as  a  result  of  anti-inflationary  government  policies  in  1985.  As  outside
funds  became scarce, regional  organizations collapsed one by one, leaving
their  member  associations  withoxut credit  and  other  vital  supplies.
Although structural  weaknesses in  the cooperative  system could not  be held
solely  responsible  for the  financial  crisis  in  Israeli  agriculture,
excessive  financial  inter-reliance  between  first-and  second  order
cooperatives is believed to have played a crucial role (Kislev et al.,
1988).
The fact that credit cooperatives are owned and operated by their
own clients subjects  them to an inherent  conflict of interest between the
two owner categories, depositors and borrowers. As each party is trying
to enhance  its interest, the cooperative's policy with regard to loan36
collection  enforcement, moral  hazard and  interest rates  is  likely to
reflect  the interest  of  tho  dominating  group.  Although  credit  cooperatives
were  originally  conceived  as  comprehensive  financial  intermediaries
offering  credit  and  deposit  services,  cooperative  rhetoric and government
intervention have often led  them  to  pursuS a  "cheap  credit" policy at the
expense of  the depositors. This policy, made possible through  unduly low
Interest rate  ceilings  and  access to  subsidized  external  credit  has
affected the composition of the credit  cooperative's clientele as members
joined  to have  access  to cheap loans  rather  than to  use  the organizationIs
savings  services.  The  results  of  this  strategy  are  stunted  savings
mobilization,  financial dopendence  on  (sometimes uncertain)  external
sources and, "borrower dominated organizations open to problems of moral
hazard and risk *xposuro  ln their  administration"  (Poyo, 1988).  The
pressure to  transfer  profits to  m mbers  can  also  lead to  inadequate
allocation of retained funds as reserve.
Reliance  on  members'  savings  and  capital  contribution  is  an
important  element in successful  credit cooperatives.  Indeed,  that credit
cooperatives can play a vital role in  rural savings  mobilization has been
shown by studies describing experiences in  Guatemala,  Togo,  Cameroon,
Rwanda, Bangladesh,  Taiwan, South  Korea  and  many others.  Extensive savings
mobilization  campaigns  and  innovative  offers  for  deposits  adapted  to  local
rural conditions  have helped  credit  unions  to  increase  their  own  funds  and
attain near self-sufficiency  in  many of these countries. In  Rwanda, where
credit unions were created  for the  specific purpose of  rural savings
mobilization, membership grew by 47% between 1977-86, with real savings
deposits growing at an average annual rate of 34.8% and  outstanding loans37
at  54.4%.  In Togo and Cameroon  these numbers were  25% and  14.5%  for
savings respectively, and 33.3% and 32.4% for loans respectively. In all
threo  countries  credit union  savings and  loans grow at  significantly
higher rates than the national average (Cuevas,  1988)  6  The proposition
that  credit cooperatives which rely heavily on members' voluntary savings
as funds for  their loans generally fare botter in terms of loan recovery
can  be  confirmed  with.  examples from Honduras, the Dominican Republic,
Cameroon,  South  Korea,  Taiwan and  others.-  A credit  cooperative  pilot
project in  the Dominican  Republie  emphasized  technlcal  assistance, savings
mobllzation  and  educatlonai campaigns and a slgnifLcant increase in real
interest rates, and resulted in a substantial rLse of membership. As a
result,  savings  and  concurrently  loans  grew  signlficantly  faster  in
partLeLpating unions than  in others. And most  Lndlcatlve of all, loan
delinquency  rates  dropped  markedly,  to  below  10%  (from  rates  as  high  as
50% in certain  cas-s)  (Poyo,  1988).  7  A  survey  of  18  credit  cooperatives
in  Honduras  revealed  that  the  flnanclal health  of  these  organizatlons  was
dlrectly  related  to  Lnterest  rate  pollieLs.  Credit  cooperatlves  with
higher  rates  benefitted  from  higher  deposlts  and  lower  loan  delinquencies
6 Although  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  these  figures  pertain  to  a
national  average  of  all  credit  unions,  it  can  be  concluded  that  union  savings
and  loans  grew  significantly  in  rural  areas,  as  rural  credit  unions  outnumber
urban  unions.
7  An  interestlng  fact  about  the  increased  interest  rates  in  the  Dominican
project  is,  tb  effective  interest  rates  remalned  basically  ionstant  despite
a  doubling  in  nominal  rates.  Credlt  unions  required  share  accounts  as
compensatlng  deposits.  When  interest  rates  were low  and  funds  scarce  this  balance
amounted  to  up  to  67%  of  the value of  the loan,  thus  slgnificantly  increasing
the  effectlve  interest  rate on  the  loan.  Wlth  lncreased  funds  available  from
higher  savings,  this  balance was  significantly  reduced  allowlng  malntenance  of
constant effective rates deospit doubling nominal rates.38
and therefore  experienced les  liquidity problems (Poyo, 1983). In the
mid-60s, an interest rate reform and savings mobilization campaign also
led  to  a  boost  of  voluntary  savings  deposits  in  South  Korea.  The
proportion of total savings deposits held by rural cooperatives rose from
9%  to  16%  within  a  year  of  the  increased  rates.  The  Korean  rural
cooperative credit system has expanded enormously over the last 15 years
and now satisfies &bout  80%  of short  term rural  credit requirements (Yun,
1987). Local  cooperatives have constantly been increasing  their own funds
thanks  to  repeated  and  extensive  savings mobilization  campaigns  and
constantly  growing  diversification  of  rural  credit  markets  with  a
multitude of different  deposits tailored :o  the  needs of the local farming
population. The agricultural cooperatives' mutual credit system carries
higher  interest  rates  than  other  banking  institutions,  and  this  is
believed to have been a major factor behind the cooperative's deposits
growing faster than those of banks (Yun, 1987). While repayment rates in
South  Korea  are generally  high,  it  is  interesting to  note  that  low
interest loans formed over 98% of the National Agricultural Cooperative
Federation's overdues in 1979 (Lee,  1984).
A  further question relating to cooperative structure is whether
credit cooperatives fare better as single purpose cooperative, such as
credit  unions,  or  as  multipurpose  organizations.  Multipurpose
cooperatives  have theoretically  several potential  advantages: farmers cai.
satisfy  their diverse  needs at the same  place and therefore save  time; the
cooperative may gain access to more complete information about a loan
applicant; savings  deposits and loan  repayments can be linked  to revenues
from crop marketing ard production credit can be granted at the same time39
as inputs  are  delivered.  An example  where  savings  mobilization  has  been
successfully  linked  to crop  marketing  is the  Kenyan  Cooperative  Savings
Scheme.  Under this system,  receipts  from the marketing  of coffee are
directly  credited  to an interest-bearing  account  with the cooperative.
This system  has very successfully  increased  funds available  for  rural
credit. It must, however,  be noted  that some of this success  must be
ascribed  to the  fact  that  the  cooperative  is  dealing  with  an export  crop
for which the farmers  can hardly  find any other outlets.  Whether  the
scheme  could  have  worked  as successfully  with  crops  that  can  be marketed
outside the system is questionable.
Some of the problems of  incorporating  credit facilities into
multipurpose  associations  have already  been noted above.  Promotion  of
multiple services  at the same time is likely to heavily strain the
organization's managerial  and  financial  resources.  Multipurpose
cooperatives are  also  more  likely to  be  subject to  government
interference,  as they can be used to promote a multitude  of policy
components.  Carrying  out  government  policies,  however,  implies  increased
reliance  on  external  funds,  which,  in  turn,  affects  the  autonomy  and  self-
sustainability  of cooperatives.  The performance  record  of multipurpose
organizations, especially those  which  engage also  in  cooperative
production  has  generally  been  poor  because  they  are  subject  to  an  inherent
conflict between individual  production  maximization  and  cooperative
production  objectives.  Multipurpose  activities  can also endanger  credit
operations,  if  these  yield  surpluses  which  are  then  used  to finance  other
affairs.  A case in point  are  the  Taiwanese  Farmers'  Associations.  These40
experienced serious  difficulties  because  their business  components drained
resources from the profitable credit operations (Sheu, 1980).
Across  developing  countries,  the  most successful  credit cooperatives
have  been  those  which  have  limited  their  activities  to  savings
mobilization, lending  and related  financial  services,  and  largely  depended
on  their  own  funds.  It  seems  thus  fair  to  conclude  that  credit
cooperatives  should  not  be  expanded  or  linked  to  other  cooperative
activities  unless  particularly  conducive  circumstances  and  adequate
management  capacity  exist.  For  example,  a  linkage  between  a  marketing
and  credit  cooperative  may  provide  opportunities  for  better  loan
collection  if  farmers  have  no  alternative  marketing  channels.  The  link
should  not  be  attempted if  managerial  capacities  do  not  allow  for  it.  The
Korean  cooperative  system  did  not  link  credit  to  other  services  at  the
local  level  until  a  sound  managerial  network existed.  Although  the
National Agricultural Cooperative Federation  (NACF) took over all the
facilities  and manpower of the government's agricultural bank right from
the  beginning,  a cooperative  financing  system  involving  local  cooperatives
was  not  established  until almost  10 years  after the  founding of the
multipurpose  cooperative  organization.  Initially  the  NACF  channelled
largely  government  funds.  Extensive  training  of  cooperative  personnel  at
the  national  and  local level preceded a step-by-step development of the
nationwide  cooperative  finance  system.  Local  cooperatives  did  not  get
involved  until  they  had grown strong from their  involvement in other
cooperative  activities  and the NACF's credit and banking business had
developed  into  a  financially  and  organizationally strong entity.41
C.  Availability  of  Supportina  Infrastructure,  Proper  lanagemnt  and
Oversight
Similar to Agricultural Development Banks and other rural financial
institutions, credit  cooperatives have often  suffered  from inadequate
leadership,  a  lack  of  well  defined  managerial  responsibilities  and
insufficient accounting and controlling facilities. The ability to track
financial performance is a prerequisite for sound management and overall
performance cf  any  credit  institution. Loan collection  and  denial  of
access  to  new  loans before outstanding  debts  are  settled  depends on
adequate record keeping. Yet instances where records of loan collection
have been  inaccurate or nonexistent are not uncommon.  For example,  a
survey of credit cooperatives in Niger found that less than half of the
local leaders  were in possession of a record indicating who was eligible
for a loan and less than a quarter had records indicating the amounts
received by each farmer.  Such information was believed to be kept in
memorized form by most leaders. (Cuevas  et.al., 1988).
One  reason  for  ineffective  cooperative  management  is  lack  of
adequate  training,  or the  frequent focus of  training  efforts  on  the
national rather than the local level.  This danger especially exists when
cooperatives are the result of a top-down intervention.  In Nigeria, for
example,  cooperative  training  was  solely directed  towards  government
cooperative  officials  with  the  result  that  conflicts  between  higher
cooperative  management,  local  staff  and  members  seriously  affected
cooperative performance (Rochin et.al., 1988). This is not to say that
training  and a strong  management at the  regional or national level are not
essential. In fact, well trained people at this level are crucial if the42
organizatic.n  is  to assist  its  member associations  in  financial  management,
auditing and training. Strict accounting rules and external control are
essential in an environment where the local population does not have the
necessary means and skills to check on the performance of local managers.
The South Korean agricultural cooperatives and the Comilla Projects in
Bangladesh  both  drew  their  initial  strength  from  sound planning  and
management capabilities at the top. In both cases, however, the umbrella
organization played subsequently a vital role in training local leaders
and individual members. While internal efficiency and organization  is
undoubtedly important for credit cooperatives, emphasis also needs to be
put on social development management at the grass roots level.  Credit
cooperatives starting as local bottom-up organizations and emphasising
institutional  and  human  resources  development  have  been  the  most
successful cooperative financial intermediaries. Excellent results of a
project in Cameroon which focussed  heavily on training of local  managers
and borrowing  farmers and allowed  for active  farmer participation  in
credit cooperatives planning and technical assistance activities further
illustrate  the  importance of  these  aspects.  Members  savings  in  the
participating organizations grew two to three times faster than those of
other  cooperatives  and  loan delinquency rates  fell  to 0.5%  (from an
already low rate of less than 10%) (von  Pischke et.al., 1983).
D. Avoiding Inappropriate Governmental and Political Interference
Governments  and  international donor  agencies  have  often  used  credit
cooperatives to promote  social objectives unrelated  to their  role as
financial intermediaries. In some  cases these organizations were used to43
channel government funds for  non-financial purposes because they were the
only well  functioning and effective organizational structures in rural
areas.  Often, the utilization of external funds obliged the management
of credit cooperatives to lend at artifically low interest rates and for
act'lAties which would otherwise be considered too risky.  Thus, these
interventions have often  had detrimental effects on the  cooperatives,
viability.  They  have  often  experienced  serious  problems  after  governmert
or  donor  assistance  expired.  Excess  demand  for  cooperative  services
promoted  by  excessively  low  prices  for  credit  and other services, coupled
with  low  profits  and  consequent  low  capitalization,  has  often  made
cooperatives  highly  vulnerable  to  external  shocks  or  poor  internal
management.  Continuous  reliance on government resources can create the
impression  that  the  government  will bail out indebted farmers and their
organization  if  the  need  arises.  The  negative  effect  of  excessive
reliance  on  a  continuous  inflow  of  external  funds  on  the  credit
cooperative's motivation and abillty to raise its own resources and the
related negative impact on  loan repayments has already been discussed
above. It is thus advisable  that government and donor assistance focus on
institution building, training and improvemen- of management abilities at
all levels of the cooperative system rather than supply of cheap credit.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Rural group and cooperative lending have often been undertaken in
response to the failure of specialized financial institutions to supply
'arge numbers of  small farmers with  adequate amounts of credit while
re-mining f±nancially viable. It has been expected that lending through44
groups or credit cooperatives could successfully reach small producers
with credit on favorable terms, while being compatible with satisfactory
financial performance of the  institutions involved. In the cas-s  of group
lending, this  expectation was based on,the  assumption that transaction
costs could be reduced  by processing a single large  group loan  rather than
a multitude of small  ones.  It was further  believed that joint liability,
a sense of common purpose, poer pressure and access to more  accurate
information about borrowers would vreduce the risk of default  and  the
losses related to lt. In the case of cooperatives, savings mobilization
was expected to provide a basis for intermediation and thus increase the
availability of credit to those who need it.  The logical conclusion has
been that savings mobilization, reduced lending transaction costs, and
smaller delinquency rates  would bring about financial  viability of credit
cooperatives and could significantly improve the performance of lenders
engaging  in group  loans. Therefore, lending to small farmers would  be
turned into a more profitable enterprise and, hence, more lenders would
be willing to supply credit to small farmers.  In practice, the record of
both group lending and credit cooperatives has been mixed.
The present review  of group lending  projects has shown that lenders
normally  faced  lower  administrative costs  as  long as  they  were  not
responsible  for  group  formation  expenses.  Some experiences  have  shown  that
administrative  costs  of  group  lending programs  can  be  significantly
reduced over  time, as start  up  costs related  to  group formation  disappear.
Where  borrowers, transaction costs  have been  reported,  they compared
favorably with  costs  as they would  have accrued  to  individual  small
borrowers. Although almost all group lending  programs reviewed relied on45
some form  of joint liability, loan delinqu-ncy rates have not always been
reduced compa_ed to individual loans. Nevertheless,  experience seems to
suggest that  joint liability can positively  influence repayment under
certain circumstances. Successful group lending schemes have shown that
high repayment rates can be achieved with small, homogeneous borrowing
groups which are  jointly liable  and assume  themselves some  managerial and
supervisory responsibilities.  Most successful  group lending  programs have
only granted relatively small amounts of credit in order to diminish the
possibility of borrowers' exceeding their debt capacity. Reimbursement in
small, regular installments adapted to the living and earning conditions
of the borrowers also has a positive effect on  loan repayments. A common
bond other than credit, much as mandatory deposits which will only be
reimbursed  to  the  group  upon  full  repayment  of  all  loans  further  enhance
loan  repayment.  Group  members,  previous  experience  with  group  lending  or
other  group  activities  also  has  a  positive  effect  on  repayment  rates.
Practice  has  shown  that  in  many  countries  the  most  effective  and
least  costly  (from  the  lenders' point of view) way of enforcing joint
liability  is  to  deny  access  to  future  credit  to  all  group  members  in  case
of  default  by  the  group  or  any  of  its  members.  Obviously,  this  threat  only
works  as  long  as  the lender is in a position to provide good clients
access  to  favorable  and  timely  credit  services  in  the  future.  Examples
where  loan  delinquencies  increased  in  correlation  with  deteriorating  and
untimely  credit  services  abound.  The  danger  of  not  being  able  to  guarantee
access  to  future  services  evidently  increases  the  more  a  lender  depends
on  continuous  infusions  of  external  funds  and  the  less  a  program  is
financially  viable  and  self-sustainable  through  leposit  mobilization.  In46
particular, low interest rates on  loans made to small-farmers h-.ve  been
a major reason for unoustainability. Because denial of future access to
credit ha. ln practice often been the only way to effectively enforce
joint liability, mandatory joint liability has in reality almost always
been reduced to voluntary joint liability. It is still perceivable that
the  psychological  pressure  arising  from  mandatory  joint  liability
encourages groups to  exercise increased pressure on defaulting  peers.
However, some experiences seem to suggest that mandatory joint liability
has only a positive effect on repayments  as long as borrowers have strong
reason to believe that the majority of their p  ers will also repay.
Much of the success of group or cooperative programs also depends
on the atmosphere in which they are started. Cultural conditioning can
very much  hinder or  facilitate the  development of  a  sense  of  joint
responsibility  and  cooperation.  Education  of  borrowers  tnd  farmer  support
services  are  an  essential  component  of  successful  group  or  cooperative
lending  programs.  Both  the  group  credit  program  in  Malawi  and  the  Grameen
Bank  Project  in  Bangladesh  are  supported  by  such  services  and  much  of
their  success  has  been  ascribed  to  these  educational  efforts.  Similarly,
appropriate  training  of the financial  intermediary's  employees is  crucial.
Besides  adequate  supervisory  and  accounting  techniques,  reliable  record
keeping  is  essential.  Threats  to  deny  future  access  to  credit  in  case  of
default  are  not  credible unless the lender has an  appropriate  means  of
determining which groups and individuals must be excluded from further
benefits.
With  a few exceptions, group lending programs as they currently
exist  have  neglected  to  explore  and  build  up  relationships  other  than47
credit  between  the  lender and  the group  or within  the  group  itself.
Savings  generation  can  help  develop  crucial  skills  such  as  financial
responsibility  through  regular  deposits.  It  can  also  enhance  better
repayment  performance  because  each  member's  deposit  can be viewed as an
implicit collateral in  case  of  default  by  any  group  member.  Despite  these
advantages,  savings  mobilization  in  relation  with  group  lending  has
largely been neglected so far.  Ways to develop borrower groups into self-
financing rural credit organizations through savings mobilization should
be  explored.  Developments  along  this  path  could  lead  to  a  natural
extension  of  successful  group  lending  schemes  into  credit  cooperatives.
Such  a  development  could allow credit cooperatives to build up slowly and
benefit  from  borrowers,  previous  experience  with  joint  responsibility  and
savings. Developments  along  this  line  could help avoid one of the most
frequent  causes  of  failure  in  credit  cooperatives,  namely  hasty
establisnment  before  their  members  understand  them.
Many  of  the  credir  cooperatives  which have tailed suffered from one
of  two  major  weaknesses:  inadequate  preparation  and  participation  of their
members,  and  lack  of  adequate  management.  Top-down  imposition  of
cooperatives  has  often  resulted  in  the  exc.lusion  of  active  membership
participation. This is especially true where governments promoted  the
cooperative movement without paying attention to the fundamertals of the
movement,  and  essential  decisions  and  actions  are  carried  out  by
government workers rather than cooperative managers and members. In this
situation members at the primary level have failed to develop a sense of
ownership  and  did  not  view  the  cooperative  as  more  than  a  supplier  of
cheap  services.  Top-down  management  has  often  prevented  the  development48
of a personal  relationship between  the leadership  and  cc  -rative  members.
As  a  result,  the  potential  advantages  of  familiarit,  could  not  be
exploited in relation with  credit allocation or loan collection. These
problems have often been exacerbated by insufficiently trained managers
and staff. Training of personnel  has  frequently  been concentrated at the
national level, while education of local leaders and cooperative members
was neglected. Cooperatives which have focussed  on well trained managers,
bottom-up institutional  development  and training at the grass roots level
have, however, yielded good results and proven the importance of these
aspects. Much of the success of the agricultural cooperatives in Taiwan
and South Korea goes back to strong and committed management at the top
and intensive training of administrators and cooperative members at the
local level.
Apex institutions play an important role in assisting their local
member  associations  with  training  programs.  In  some  countries  apex
institutions  have  also  provided  auditing  services  to  their  member
associations.  This  aspect  is  of  crucial  importance because it can help
prevent  illegal  behavior  of  hired  local  personnel  where  the  local
leadership  does  not  have  the  capacity  to  do  so.  As  with  group  lending
programs,  inadequate  accountability  and  record  keeping  have  often  been
partially  responsible  for  failures  of  credit  cooperatives.
Some  apex  organizations  have  also  successfully  assisted  their  member
associations  with  portfolio  and liquidity  management.  Regional  or national
organizations often  have  a comparative advantage  in these  activities
because they can benefit from  scale economies,  more diverse cashflows and
risk diversification. Care must, however, be taken that the division of49
responsibillties  between  the  apex institution  and  its members  be  well
defined and that financial lnter-reliance not become too heavy, The apex
institutlons must  exercise caution because local organizations tend to
overborrow in such a relationship.
Where cheap  outside funds have been continuously available, credit
cooperatives have neglected to engage in savings mobilization and failed
to become  self-reliant. Examples in  various countries  have, however, shown
that  rural credit  unions can  successfully draw on  untapped  resources
through  savings  mobilization.  Although  the  supply  of  deposits  may
initially be more service than interest elastic, higher interest rates,
coupled  with  savings mobilization  campaigns  have  been  successful  in
raising membership. and deposits whenever they were introduced. Thanks to
innovative  offers of  depSKits, adapted  to the condition  of the local  rural
population, membership, savings and concurrently loans of credit unions
have  grown  above  the  national  average  in  many  countries.  Credit
cooperatives  (in fact most  frequently pure credit  unions) which  have
relied on members' deposits rather than external sources for funds have
experienced far fewer llqu!dity problems and generally achieved better
repayment records. Thanks to their efficient and innovative approaches
these organizations have been able to bring savings and lending services
to groups neglected by other institutions.
Cooperative which have expanded their activities beyond  the finance
area before the institution was organizationally and financially viable
have  often run into serious  problems.  While  multipurpose cooperatives  may
under  certain  circumstances  facilitate  loan  collection  and  savings
mobilization, rural financlal  cooperatives  should  not be linked  with  other50
services before the institutional and financial prerequisites have  been
achieved,  unless particularly beneficial  circumstances for linkage  exist.
Most  successful  credit  cooperatives  have,  however,  restricted  their
activities to the provision of lending and savings services.
Government  or  international  donor  intervention  in  cooperative
affaLrs has frequently  had a detrimental effect. It has provoked top-down
imposition of the organization and strained the institutions' managerial
and financial capacities by using them for purposes other than financial
intermediation.  It  also tended  to cause  deviation from  prudent and  viable
lending practices.  Positive experiences have shown that goveritrent  or
donor support should focus on institution building, management training,
introduction  of  and  training  in  improved  accounting  systems,  loan
evaluation procedures, recovery  practices and training at the grass roots
level, rather than the provision of cheap funds for credit.
Most of the unsuccessful experiences with group lending and credit
cooperatives  are  due  to  shortcomings  in  their  implementation  and
complementary  activities  rather  than  inadequacy  of  the  approaches
themselves.  This  suggests  that  these  lending  arrangements  do  hold
potential  to  reach  small  farmers  with  credit  while  allowing  financial
intermediaries  to  function  as  viable  institutions.  Documented  experiences
have  shown  that  rural  financial  cooperatives  can  very  successfully
mobilize savings if properly  organized.
Lending groups and credit cooperatives exist  in many World  Bank
client  countries.  The  Bank  rarely  interacts  directly  with  these
organizations,  but  they figure frequently  among  its subloan  beneficiaries.
Therefore, Bank projects should put more emphasis on recommending howS1
credit  cooperatives  and  londing  groups  can  be  used  most  effectively  in
individual  client  countries.  As  experience  has  shown,  credit  cooperatives
are most effectively  assisted  in institution  building  and tra'ning  of
managers  at the apex and  possibly  even  at  the  local level.  Most staff
appraisal reports of  agricultural  credit projects mention credit
cooperatives  and  lending  groups  as  possiblo  subborrowers  but fall  short
of  explaining  how  these  arrangements  actually  work  in  the  country
concerned  or whether  they need to be reformed.  As highlighted  in this
paper,  certain  design  attributes  are  crucial  for  the  successful
functioning  of lending  groups  and  credit  cooperatives.  It  is  equally  true
that  the  economic  and  political environment, implementation and
complementary  activities  are  critical  aspects.  Therefore,  the  Bank  should
put more emphasis on  analyzing the  role and  performance  of  these
arrangements  in credit  systems  it supports  through  its projects.  Whe.i
they  exist  among  beneficiaries  but  perform  poorly,  the  Bank  should  insist
on  structural  changes.  But  these  can  only  be  demanded  Lf  the  strengths  and
weaknesses  as well as the potential  these arrangements  hold in the
particular  country  environment  are known.  These  issues  can be addressed
in sector  work on rural  credit  issues  or by studies  Ln the context  of
credit  or  agricultural  projects.- 52 -
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